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Some define ambition as the major driving force behind
discovery and innovation. Urbandictionary.com has a different take:
Ambition:
"What drives man to achieve failure with greater speed then
had he just let fate run its course."
In truth, there is nothing inherently wrong with tackling an
ambitious project. But proper planning, testing, and project management must
accompany these endeavors, especially in large, complex systems where many
things can go wrong. The automated baggage handling system designed for the Denver
International Airport (DIA) remains a prime example of how not to handle such
extensive projects.
An Extensive Project
Indeed
 The Denver International Airport (DIA), which opened in
February 28, 1995, has since been the largest airport by area in the United
States at 53 square miles. Along with its grand size, authorities had a grand
vision for their airport's baggage handling system: full automation.
(Snapshot of a section of the DIA Baggage Handling System. Image Credit: Calleam -->)
The "Integrated Automated Baggage Handling System" would
handle all baggage (including transfers) between check-in, the aircraft, and
pick-up on arrival for all three of the airport's concourses. The system would
include 26 miles of underground track, thousands of small gray carts, and an
expansive computerized system programmed for just-in-time delivery. It would be
the savior of modern airport design, providing unmatched efficiency and
capacity. But the project, plagued by technical challenges and time
constraints, did not work out as planned.
Too Much, Too Soon
The original opening of the airport scheduled for October
31, 1993 was delayed nearly a year and a half due to an overwhelming number of
difficulties and problems with the construction of the baggage system.
BAE, the company in charge of building the system, was
contracted in the fall of 1991. Experts say the main problem was a lack of
time. The project timetable was too constraining and did not provide allowance
for potential problems and for sufficient testing. BAE knew the schedule was
not realistic; their VP of engineering initially told the media, "It's a 3-4
year job we were asked to do in 2 years." As time went on, project delays
compounded along with human errors.
The planning and communication surrounding the project was
also a mess. Airport construction had already begun before BAE's design project
began. Problems subsequently arose due to a variety of size and space
constraints in the buildings and tunnels, which were built without
consideration for the needs of the baggage system. The solution to these
difficulties would have been to design and build the baggage system alongside
its surrounding structures. DIA officials also failed to properly communicate
with BAE when changes in plans and timetables were made.
BAE was not completely off the hook, however. Because the
system was so technologically advanced for the time, they had unrealistic
expectations for its performance. Engineers and project leaders did not allow a
proper margin of error. An operations manager for the communications network at
DIA said, "The system pushed the envelope of technology. The components that
were put into the system were run right to the limit of what they were designed
for." As such, when some components failed, others failed in turn. Issues
included numerous mechanical, electrical, and software flaws.
Leaving Baggage
Behind
Serious problems with the system were first made public in
March of 1994, when the installation staff ran the BAE system for several media
groups. Flaws caused the baggage to be thrown around, displaced, and chewed up.
Reports estimated an average of $1 million/day was added to the total
construction costs as technical modifications were made over the many months
that followed. Over its entire lifespan, additional costs for the project were
said to be $100 million for construction and $341 million in interest.
The extra money and countless modifications to the original
design allowed the system to be used at around 12 percent of its originally
intended capacity over the next ten years. Even then, the conventional manual
sorting and transport system (originally put in place as a backup to automation)
was more efficient. In 2005, the automated system was
ditched in an effort to cut costs.
Part of the problem with ambition is it becomes increasingly
hard to let a failed project go. An airline analyst's response to the
abandonment in 2005 said, "They're finally admitting to reality. They wanted to
make it work, but they couldn't get it to work." The first step in learning
from failure is being able to accept it and move on. And let's face it, in this
case there is a lot to learn from.
References
Cal
Poly - Denver's Baggage Problems
Calleam
Consulting - Denver Airport Baggage System Case Study
MIT
- The Baggage System At Denver: Prospects and Lessons
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