Safety Engineering

Here's a thought. From someone who doesn't work in safety. How about studying at what point does the nth caution or warning detract from the benefit of providing safety instructions at all.

The very first caution is likely read and heeded, the second also, but as the safety instructions run to pages, fewer will bother to read it and it may be that when a manual reaches a certain critical size, no one reads it at all.

One would generate a curve, akin to the Laffer curve in economics, showing how much safety-related instruction is needed and heeded, and at what point an extra instruction does more harm than good.

That would force the writers of safety manuals to write manuals that protect the customer, rather than the company. The safety engineer would have to prioritize the cautions and dispense with those that outnumber the maximum allowed cautions. If the actual number of required cautions exceeded the maximum tolerable by the average user, the product would need to be redesigned to eliminate the extra cautions. In other words, the design of products and the writing of safety manuals would once again become the job of engineers, as opposed to lawyers.

If some trial lawyer were to read this post, it could easily become the basis for the next damage case against some unfortunate deep pockets corporation. I rest easy, however, knowing that sort of creature wouldn't be caught dead reading an engineering forum.

emc_c

I think some very good studies could be done on whether these methods actually improve safety. One would think that hazard analyses using these methods should be useful in flagging and reducing the hazards of various processes. And surely they sometimes do. However, I have found in my ammonia refrigeration work that these techniques tend to focus on unrealistic scenarios, and to be overbearingly bureaucratic and retentive. I suspect that much money is wasted on paperwork and mindless procedure, some of which could be better spent on addressing bona fide issues.

The OSHA scheme for PHAs (process hazard analyses) is actually quite sensible, but somehow it has spawned a weird discipline of consultants who seem to know how to read the regulations, but not how to speak in real language accessible to plant operators. In turn, there are now operators who hold various certifications, but have little idea of how to run a refrigeration system.

See also emc_c's prior post.

Dear Matt,

I suppose that were I to do a PHD Thesis, I'd look for the most dangerous jobs, and find the companies with the best safety records doing that and then compare those with the companies with the worst records, and then figure out why things went better at the same sorts of jobs for one company, than at another.

I've long wondered what exactly happened when the Chrysler Building was built that overcame the normally estimated one death per story, so that there was zero death per story.

In my professional capacity as a Key Grip for films, I had charge of safety, and took it very seriously, but never tried to belabor it.

I did get into the habit of making a safety speech at the start of every working day, that went like this: This is my Safety Speech for Today: Work Safe!

It seemed to work, as when I was in control, nobody ever got hurt on one of my sets.

As far as systematic safety standards and procedures I think very highly of practices common to Aviation. Flying around off the ground at high speeds is inherently dangerous, so for a PHD Thesis I'd suggest a study of those precepts and events that have led over time to standard operating procedures adhered to by ground services, mechanics, and pilots.

As it turns out, I am in a conference this week where the subject has given me reason to think that...

Codes and standards across North America, and perhaps further afield, are having a hard time keeping pace with the change in industry and the various disciplines that the codes and standards regulate.

As one way of addressing this issue, some of the code making bodies have migrated a few of those codes to include an "Objective Based" component. For example... the "2005 National Building Code of Canada" and the newly minted "CAN/CSA C22.4 Objective Based Industrial Electrical Code".

Such codes are sideways step from their previous versions (C22.4 is new subset of the C22.x family) of purely prescriptive codes.

Your topic... Do an analysis of whether or not any migration of any of the prescriptive codes to an objective based foundation, can be shown to be a negative factor in reported incidents of a safety nature, ie fire, shock and loss of life.

As a safety regulator... I would be very interested in such a paper and would offer assistance.

When emc_c posted that originally, I immediately thought of the loss function, and waste. Loss to society. But in my communications training, the principle that we have been following has been "tell them seven times, seven different ways. when we do that we get proof of message reciept and retention. Did you mean 'to justify NOt adding low risks to technical instructions?" milo

Study why we are afraid to intervene.

Focus in on SIL, and how manufacturers are starting to incorporate SIL designs into their products. At this point, I do not consider products unless they are SIL 2 rated. I have been trying to increase my LOPA ratings for my existing systems.

http://scholar.google.co.in/scholar?q=Safety+engineering&hl=en&btnG=Search&as_sdt=2001&as_sdtp=on http://www.scirus.com/srsapp/search?q=safety+engineering&t=all&sort=0&g=s

The analysis methods you mentioned are good. Some hot topics to which you can apply them include genetically-modified foods and how their life cycle could have impacts on crop, animal, and human health; cell phone radiation and their effects on the human brain and other body parts; electronic (as opposed to hard-wired or hard-linked) safety systems (a la Toyota recall)

My opinion ... forget'hot topics'. For one thing, everyone will aim for them and you'll find it harder to make your mark in your field. Do something IMPORTANT that no one's thought about (the secret to my sucess in the energy field, by the way ;-)).

My recommendation: something having to do with human and organizational psychology, and cultural and sociological influences and attitudes on safety. No matter how well a system is set up on paper, no matter how exalted a written corporate commitment is, local and national psychology and social protools always dominate.

Case in point: 10 of my colleagues who worked on Petrobras' offshore oil-platform P-36 died in 2001, their bodies shredded by a gas explosion onboard, and their bodies are now at the bottom of the South Atlantic off the coast of Brazil. The proximate auses are various, but the underlying cause was total and flagrant disregard for safety, and corporate orders to produce oil and as WHILE THE PLATFORM'S CONSTRUCTION WAS BEING FINISHED OFFSHORE!!!!

Every time we'd fly in by helicopter, we'd have to go through a 30-minute briefing of the accidents that had happened while we had been away (for three weeks): electrocuted electricians with burns and nerve damage because they worked on valves whose power they hadn't shut off; pipefitters with bits of metal shot into their eyes because they didn't feel like wearing plastic masks when grinding pipe welds; explosive concentrations of natural gas detected in generator rooms (!!!) and guys sent there to check them out (no accidents, but could have been open door, whoosh, bam!), smoking and twice-weekly BBQs (:O !!!) on the main deck while the platform was producing nat.gas ... and there were gas leaks (!!!) (but that was OK ... the platform operations manager told me that the deck's water sprinklers kept us safe ... :O :O :O !!!!!!!). When I asked the platform workers why they didn't feel that they were in danger, they told me that BBQs are held on ALL of Petrobras' other 35 platforms. And the Italian sea-captain responsible for the platform (it was considered a sea-ship) was fine fine with all this.

The underlying cause: in Brazil, and in other societies with authoritarian or elite-based histories, people do what their superiors tell them to do AND NO MORE! Every safety issue is solved by a shrug of the shoulders, workers don't take basic precautions to protect oneself if it involves any effort (turn off valve power, get a face mask), and higher-ups (engineers, administration) are shocked and outraged when disaster strikes.

So what you should you study? Aim for the human element, my friend ... most will aim for the procedural/technical stuff, and they'll stagnate and fade in well-deserved obscurity.

Cheers! And good luck ... DZ

P.S. Perhaps this could be a cooperative effort with a psychology/sociology department?

In the past 30 years as a Safety Engineer I've witness a shift from regulatory compliance, to behavior based safety,....

What it all comes down to is improving human performance through an effective safety culture. Not a campaign, not an inspection system, not policies... None of those things alone. I'd be interested in reading about who in industry has the best Safety Culture, what makes it the best, it's impact on risk/loss, the business case for their efforts,...

Safety Culture is the overarching imperative that supports it all. I can be a MORT wizard and get a "LTA" result because I do not have a culture that supports it. I can have air tight policies but with out a culture that will execute them effectively - wasted. The same can be said all of the elements and processes.

How about looking at Safety Culture and it's impact on Human Performance Improvement.

I am reading the following cited book Gonzales, Laurence, DEEP SURVIVAL, Who Lives, Who Dies, and Why; W.W. Norton & Co.; New York, NY; 2003 On page 117, he states "A theory called risk homeostasis says that people accept a given level of risk. While it's different for each person, you tend to keep the risk you're willing to take at about the same level. If you perceive conditions as less risky, you'll take more risk. If conditions seem more risky you'll take less risk." And he states the following examples on pages 117 & 118: "The theory has been demonstrated again and again. When antilock brakes were introduced, authorities expected the accident rate to go down, but it went up. People perceived that driving was safer with antilock brakes, so they drove more aggressively. With the introduction of radar in commercial shipping, it was expected that ships would collide less frequently. The opposite proved to be true. Radar simply allowed the owners to require the captains to drive the ships harder. Technological advances intended to improve safety may have the opposite effect." I found it very interesting even though measures were taking to improve safety, humans usually takes more risks

please i am from nigeria and i intend to do my Phd in safety, however i studied metallurgy in my master's. pls i need you help.

Why switch?

My advice is to get work in Metalurgical field before the Ph.D program any how. After experience in Mills mines etc. You will have abundant insight into what needs to be learned about safety for a Ph.D. Thesis.

Serve your apprenticeship!

milo