Texas Fertiliser Plant Blast

saw a "youtube movie" from someone filming the explosion from his car, that was some blast.

I also hope that any Cr4 users and kin are ok.

Wonder how long it takes before the conspiracy theories start

+1 from Del, you guys on that side of the pond seem to be havin' a tough time at the moment.
Del

Thanks for the thoughts.

I wonder where VLY was when things blew up. He could be a suspect.

It's very sumbering and grave.

Fertilizer plants have always been violable with the terrible incident.

I recall reading about simular incidents such as Texas City in 1947.

Er..... sumbering?

Sombering...

http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/somber

I was on a plane and my internet connection was about to drop.

This type of hazard has been around for a long time. Why aren't they required to be located in a remote area? An uninhibited zone around the plant big enough that no one outside that area would be hurt if there was an explosion. There are plenty of desolate areas where this could be done. Of course, this would be government interfering with private enterprise.

Insofar as the conspiracy, it will, naturally, be blamed it on the Obama administration.

I bet the kolache shop there in West located out on the interstate is doing a booming business. It probably wasn't damaged. The Czeck Restaurant downtown was probably damaged. It serves the best food in Texas.

For the people in West, all of us down here in Aggieland send our prayers. We know you will recover, but, boy; it's going to be hard.

Have some fun today,

PAPADOC

RMFR

A project must address all of the negative points that can be raised against it and still have it come out a plus argument.

Why aren't they required to be located in a remote area? An uninhibited zone around the plant big enough that no one outside that area would be hurt if there was an explosion.

Come on now!.......... Because the town grew around where the jobs

The explosion was uninhibited . Unfortunately, the area was not uninhabited.

I appreciate the news that within 18 hours of the explosion the mayor announced that they had enough help as aid workers were coming in from as far as a hundred miles away.

This is Texas. We come to the aid of those in need. We do not sit and wait to be rescued.

I can think of no better place to be in the coming zombie apocalypse.

-A-

sounds like a jab at Louisiana

No Disaster Control Plan? The fire dept. not being appraised of the likely progression of a fire? Living with substandard safety installations and proceedures? The town council authorizing building permits for two schools within 300 yards? OSHA finding inspection faults and fining them a whopping $3200.- within last couple of years, that's all? It's a sorry affair!

If that is correct, it's the cause that has to be addressed, not moving the plant to an isolated location.

Water's what caused the explosion and killed the 12 volunteer fire fighters who were on scene.

At least that what I recall hearing, but can't confirm.

Thats still the effects, Have to dig a little deeper lyn,........ on what caused the explosion.

What caused the explosion? Very likely fire spread to ammonium nitrate. Some degree of confinement occurred, maybe draft from the fire pulling a metal door shut.

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Deflagration to detonation transition can occur in ammonium nitrate with slight confinement. Once DDT occurs the ensuing shock was probably sufficient to detonate most of any ammonium nitrate anywhere near.

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Ammonium nitrate is a high explosive. It likely makes up a majority of the explosives used in the world every year. That a plant producing ammonium nitrate exploded after catching fire really shouldn't be that surprising.

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I do find it surprising that schools were constructed so close.

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I agree that the town likely grew up around the plant. I don't think the plant should be forced to move to remote locations once its success has caused population density to increase in the vicinity. I do think there should have been more caution/ prohibitive zoning for development close to the plant.

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It doesn't sound like many people that should have been well informed about the hazards of fires involving AN, were actually well informed. My guess is that firefighters and city counsel members across the country would benefit from continuing education on various aspects of industry in their area.

Still have to dig deeper. The explosion is the result. As listed in other posts, have to find the cause of the series of events that lead to the explosion.

I would concur zoning was lacks, for the school, but that is still unverified.

There are many ways fires can be started in industrial settings.

There are many ways confinement sufficient for DDT in AN can occur in a fire in an industrial setting.

I don't know enough of the specifics to suggest the exact route to the result.

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Pheonix911, I believe I am missing something you are trying to communicate. Are you are privy to information about this event that isn't obvious? Have you realized a connection or cause that is not at first obvious but upon careful consideration warrants further investigation?

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What are you trying to say?

Some of our by-product is Explosive Grade Material (Charcoal), I believe the only supplier to the government.

When we ship it they carry the required labeling. And one such customer who is using it for other reasons, does not want us to ship it with these restrictions and is trying to read in his interpretations.

What I am getting at, Yes, I know what exploded, the questions is what lead to it.

• Complacency
• Breaking the rules
• Safety Short Cuts
• $$

It will come down to human error no doubt.

Okay. I understand what you are saying. All valid points.

The dangers are well enough understood that nothing new will be learned from this even, i.e. the fault is definitely human error, as the information was there and somewhere along the line the proper procedure was deviated from.

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Just as a minor nit-picky point.... Charcoal doesn't pose the same danger as AN. AN is a high explosive all on its own, it doesn't have to be mixed intimately with air or something else to burn. AN can undergo DDT all on its own.... typical compositions with Charcoal as a principal ingredient usually just deflagrate.

Your example with disagreement over labeling is perfectly appropriate though and a great example of the way risks get reintroduced.

If the plant had been required to install deluge type water sprinkler systems, there most likely would have been a different outcome.

This is not an issue of plant location, but rather inadequate plant safety systems; a common problem in older plants.

Any investigations should start with the safety inspection teams who "fined" the plant during earlier "inspections".

As an inspector who enforces electrical safety legislation, I have to say...

Inspectors are only allowed to do what is in the legislation they enforce and what the political masters allow them. Often times we, the folk who perform these types of safety inspections, are truly horrified with what little we can really do in certain circumstances.

Do not rush to blame the inspectors... they may be fully blameless in this tragic event. You would all be saddened and I hope alarmed at what is allowed to happen to keep jobs viable in certain circumstances.

We need to get the politicians out of these processes once and for all and we must all remember that most all published safety codes and standards are acceptable minimums needed to ensure a safe installation. When we allow the state of an installation to fall below those minimum standards, and I am not saying this was the case at this plant, for economic reasons... we introduce a real failure point into an engineered system such as this.

When you get right down to it... we enforce codes and standards... and the people we report to manage risk.

from Sleepy,

Potential explosive sites, should, must be, located away from inhabited areas.

Also a good idea is to build a bund around the explosive hazard; we have done this in the UK although not with complete success as new builders encroach the hazardous area with new builds, whether industrial or homes. there are supposed to be rules against this happening!

We all have to stop being greedy.

How do we stop a fire becoming a major hazard, we should be working in those areas.

Perhaps by ordinance against hazardous materials being kept anywhere near possible conflagration sources?

Perhaps by the use of drench sprinklers across the hazard and in between possible fire sources and the hazard area.

Just a soupcon, but we have to do more to protect our citizens wherever we reside.

Good Luck America, for a while I lived and worked in Dallas and I feel for you. I visited the Waxahachie festival on at least one occasion - brilliant folk.

We are thinking about you for both Waco and Boston.

Sleepy

A properly managed PSM program would have either prevented or at very least lessened the extent of this tragedy.

Process safety management is a regulation, promulgated by the U.S. Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA). A process is any activity or combination of activities including any use, storage, manufacturing, handling or the on-site movement of highly hazardous chemicals (HHCs) as defined by OSHA and the Environmental Protection Agency.

Process safety management is an analytical tool focused on preventing releases of any substance defined as a "highly hazardous chemicals" by the EPA or OSHA.

A process includes any group of vessels which are interconnected or separate and contain Highly Hazardous Chemicals (HHC's) which could be involved in a potential release. A process safety incident is the "Unexpected release of toxic, reactive, orflammable liquids and gases in processes involving highly hazardous chemicals. Incidents continue to occur in various industries that use highly hazardous chemicals which exhibit toxic, reactive, flammable, or even explosive properties, or may exhibit a combination of these properties. Regardless of the industry that uses these highly hazardous chemicals, there is a potential for an accidental release any time they are not properly controlled. This, in turn, creates the possibility of disaster. To help assure safe and healthy workplaces, OSHA has issued the Process Safety Management of Highly Hazardous Chemicals regulation (Title 29 of CFR Section 1910.119)^[1] which contains requirements for the management of hazards associated with processes using highly hazardous chemicals." ^[2]

Any facility that stores or uses a defined "highly hazardous chemical" must comply with OSHA's process safety management (PSM) regulations as well as the quite similar United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Risk management program (RMP) regulations (Title 40 CFR Part 68). The EPA has published a model RMP plan for an ammonia refrigeration facility^[3] which provides excellent guidance on how to comply with either OSHA's PSM regulations or the EPA's RMP regulations.

The Center for Chemical Process Safety (CCPS) of the American Institute of Chemical Engineers (AIChE) has published a widely used book that explains various methods for identifying hazards in industrial facilities and quantifying their potential severity.^[4] Appendix D of the OSHA's PSM regulations endorses the use of the methods explained in that book.

This is not meant to pin blame, but to attribute cause... Let's remember that there was a fire onsite that had been going for more than 20 minutes, that is plenty of time to overheat pressure vessels and piping in the area.

Judging from the intensity of the blast it would appear that there was an extremely rapid failure of a pressure vessel that contained a flammable liquid/gas under extreme pressure caused by the heating from the original fire.

The trigger, however, was external, probably coming from the inadvertent application of cold water to the overheated and possibly glowing red piping/pressure vessel, which caused stresses that led to cracks, ultimate failure, and the release of superheated volatile chemicals directly into the pre-existing fire which acted as an ignition source.

It would be my guess (guess only, 'cause I have heard no reason myself) that it was not a flammable gas/liquid; a BLEVE of that can make a very big explosion. I would more suspect it was a silo (or whatever storage) of ammonium nitrate which can also make a huge explosion--reference the 1947 Texas City, TX, disaster in which an ocean ship and much of the town disappeared.

By definition - finding root cause will most definitely attribute blame. Ironically in this case fault is also shared by OSHA & EPA - because this fertilizer plant was allowed to operate at a lower level Program 2 RMP (below) - and - Ammonium Nitrate does not fall under OSHA's PSM nor EPA's RMP rules.

Subpart C-Program 2 Prevention Program

Contents
§ 68.48 Safety information.
§ 68.50 Hazard review.
§ 68.52 Operating procedures.
§ 68.54 Training.
§ 68.56 Maintenance.
§ 68.58 Compliance audits.
§ 68.60 Incident investigation.

http://www.safteng.net/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=2653:tx-fertilizer-plant-explosion-caught-on-camera-video&catid=49:chemical-process-safety-psmrmp&Itemid=294

http://www.safteng.net/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=2655:how-could-the-tx-fertilizer-plant-be-a-program-2-rmp&catid=49:chemical-process-safety-psmrmp&Itemid=294

http://www.ecfr.gov/cgi-bin/text-idx?c=ecfr&SID=2eecfa44ae1cf08c00e5686f2cdb568d&rgn=div6&view=text&node=40:16.0.1.1.5.3&idno=40

The key provision of PSM is process hazard analysis (PHA) - a careful review of what could go wrong and what safeguards must be implemented to prevent releases of hazardous chemicals. Covered employers must identify those processes that pose the greatest risks and begin evaluating those first. PHAs must be completed as soon as possible. At least one-quarter of the processes must be evaluated by May 26, 1994, with an additional 25 percent completed each following year so that by May 26, 1997, if not sooner, employers will have evaluated all affected processes. PSM clarifies the responsibilities of employers and contractors involved in work that affects or takes place near covered processes to ensure that the safety of both plant and contractor employees is considered. The standard also mandates written operating procedures; employee training; prestartup safety reviews; evaluation of mechanical integrity of critical equipment; and written procedures for managing change. PSM specifies a permit system for hot work; investigation of incidents involving releases or near misses of covered chemicals; emergency, action plans; compliance audits at least every three years; and trade secret protection.

To understand PSM and its requirements, employers and employees need to understand how OSHA uses the term "process" in PSM. Process means any activity involving a highly hazardous chemical including using, storing, manufacturing, handling, or moving such chemicals at the site, or any combination of these activities. For purposes of this definition, any group of vessels that are interconnected, and separate vessels located in a way that could involve a highly hazardous chemical in a potential release, are considered a single process.
==============================================================

Process Hazard Analysis (PHA) (or, Process Hazard Evaluation) is a set of organized and systematic assessments of the potential hazards associated with an industrial process. A PHA provides information intended to assist managers and employees in making decisions for improving safety and reducing the consequences of unwanted or unplanned releases of hazardous chemicals. A PHA is directed toward analyzing potential causes and consequences of fires, explosions, releases of toxic or flammablechemicals and major spills of hazardous chemicals, and it focuses on equipment, instrumentation, utilities, human actions, and external factors that might impact the process.

There are a variety of methodologies that can be used to conduct a PHA, including but not limited to: Checklist, What if?, What if?/Checklist, Hazard and Operability Study, and Failure Mode and Effects Analysis. PHA methods are qualitative in nature. The selection of a methodology to use depends on a number of factors, including the complexity of the process, the length of time a process has been in operation and if a PHA has been conducted on the process before, and if the process is unique, or industrially common. Other methods such as Layer of Protection Analysis (LOPA) ^[1] or Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) may be used after a PHA if the PHA team could not reach a risk decision for a give scenario.

In the United States, the use of PHAs is mandated by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) in its Process Safety Management regulation for the identification of risks involved in the design, operation, and modification of processes that handle highly hazardous chemicals.

I just read about the excess amount of ammonium nitrate they had on site...theres your answer!