|
Stephanie McCloskey wasn't home for Christmas. She won't be spending New Year's Eve with family or friends either. Last November, the Florida woman was sentenced to five years in prison and fined $250,000 for her role in a $15.8-million chip scandal. Over a three-year period, the former administrator for VisionTech Components sold counterfeit integrated circuits (ICs) to companies that supply the U.S. military. Victims include BAE Systems, Raytheon Missile Systems, and Northrup Grumman.
According to the Department of Justice (DOJ), the fake chips from China and Hong Kong were destined for use in missile components, radiation detectors, and even high-speed trains. Although the Department of Defense (DOD) asserts that the counterfeit ICs did not cause hardware failures or loss or life, the results could have been disastrous. But the DOD isn't in the clear yet. A recent report from the Government Accounting Office (GAO) worries that the Pentagon still lacks adequate processes for spotting fake parts.
Can your company do a better job at identifying counterfeit chips than the U.S. government or its suppliers? What safeguards do you have in place?
Source: PC World
|